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Abstract
This paper presents a model of political competition, where voter decisions are
affected by their ideological adherence to political parties. We derive a number of
interesting results: First, we show that an equilibrium exists even though voting is
fully deterministic. Second, although politicians, because of deterministic voting,
can win an election with certainty by making concessions to voters, they choose to
win the election only with some probability in order to maximize their expected
rents. Third, if the distribution of ideology is asymmetric, then political parties
follow different platforms in equilibrium. Finally, our model generates two novel
empirical predicitions, which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been tested
yet: i) the higher the ideological adherence to a political party the more inefficient
policies this party will follow, ii) the higher the number of extra votes required
for election victory (the super-majority requirement) the higher the degree of
corruption.
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1 Introduction
The extent to which some market failures (monopoly of power, externalities and the
free-rider problem) impair social welfare necessitates the use of political institutions of
government selection and empowerment in order to limit their negative effects. But
since political institutions themselves are man-made constructions they tend to suffer
from a similar set of problems as their market counterparts so that a natural question
arises: To what extent can we expect such social institutions to improve social welfare
and how significant is the welfare loss associated with their functions?
Two different strands of literature have tried to answer this question 1. On one hand
the voting literature emphasizes the role of political competition between parties as an
efficiency force, much like market competition (the Chicago school: Stigler 1971, Becker
1983, Wittman 1983), but also its shortcomings in the presence of probabilistic voting
and information asymmetries (the Virginia school: Nelson 1976, Tullock 1983, Palfrey
and Poole 1987). According to this point of view, if competition between parties is
frictionless, then the desire of politicians to be elected in combination with the selfish
motives of voters to support the most beneficial for them policies should be sufficient
conditions for the selection of the most socially preferred outcomes. But if voters have
heterogeneous preferences for politicians or for their representing ideologies and if other
frictions, in the form of uncertainty or information asymmetry, exist, then political
competition on its own can not guarantee socially desirable outcomes.
On the other hand, a growing body of literature assumes away the problem of policy
selection and focuses on the issue of policy implementation instead. Even if government
were comprised of benevolent leaders, who choose the most socially valuable objectives,
they still need to realize these objectives through government agents, who may not
share the same values. In addition, it is most likely that bureaucrats, through their
occupation with governmental affairs, acquire some form of private information so that
an agency problem arises between them and their hiring authority (Schleifer 1993,
Banerjee 1997, Acemoglu, Verdier 2000). The immediate consequence of this is the
emergence of informational rents for the bureaucrats, which usually take the form of
corruption, and the reduction of social welfare.
Our paper is mostly related to the first strand of literature, though it touches some
aspects of the second as well. We develop a simple yet very general model of political
competition between two parties (or politicians), which make proposals over future poli-
cies to voters in order to earn their support and get elected to the government. Voters
have heterogeneous preferences over the two parties, which may reflect their ideological
adherence to each one of them or any other party characteristic that differentiates po-
litical contesters in the eyes of the public. In addition, each party requires a minimum
amount of extra voters in comparison to its rival to secure election victory; otherwise
it will win the elections only with some probability. We assume that this requirement
1A third strand of the economic literature is concerned with the transition process from an ineffi-
cient set of political institutions to more efficient institutions. For example, see Acemoglu (2003) or
Acemoglu, Robinson (2000, 2001).
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is an exogenous parameter and we carry out comparative statics exercises in order to
make comparisons between different electoral rules.
The above conditions create an environment where securing political victory is costly
for self-interested politicians and hence political competition is imperfect. Election
candidates make inefficient proposals to voters because they understand that it is very
costly for their opponent to propose more attractive policies. In other words, the combi-
nation of heterogeneous voters’ preferences and the super-majority requirement weaken
political competition as contestants need not sacrifice all of their benefits from inefficient
policies in order to receive enough votes for winning the election with certainty.
More specifically, we consider an economy where there are positive and negative net
present value (NPV) projects, possessed by entrepreneurs, who have zero wealth and
so they seek external funds to undertake their projects. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we assume that there are only state-owned banks, which have available
funds and compete for attracting entrepreneurs with positive NPV projects 2. If a
politician (party) is elected in office, then he can exert pressure on the banks’ managers
to channel a part of their funds to socially inefficient projects, which can earn him rents
(or, alternatively, corruption bribes). Such an act will also imply a degree of taxation
on the profits of the socially efficient projects so that the collected taxes are provided
to state-owned banks to cover their losses.
Unfettered political competition acts as a discipline device which awards victory
to the least corrupted politician, but the super-majority requirement and ideological
adherence distort the outcome of elections. As they expect their opponents to do the
same, candidates will make proposals with positive taxation level, implying a certain
mis-allocation of funds and corruption level in the government. The greater the ide-
ological adherence of individuals to party identities or the greater the super-majority
requirement, the greater the frictions to political competition and the inefficiencies
generated by the political system.
For expositional purposes, in section 2 of the paper we present the equilibrium
outcome of the political game when ideological adherence of voters is symmetrically
distributed between the two political contesters. The most interesting part of our
paper is section 3, where we generalize our model for the case where the ideological
distribution is potentially asymmetric. There we provide a novel insight on political
competition.
In our model voting is deterministic, in the sense that given the platform a politician
offers he knows exactly how many votes he will receive. As a result, in the asymmetric
case, the politician (party) whose supporters exhibit the highest degree of ideological
adherence could propose a platform implying lower (but still positive) rents for him,
which at the same time secures him the victory in the election. However, the politician
2All of our results would go through if we allow for both private and state-owned banks competing
for attracting efficient projects. Clearly, private banks would never finance a negative NPV project. Of
course, the project financing we use here is just an example. Our argument holds true in any situation
where voters resort to the government to get a good or service, because they can not acquire it in the
marketplace.
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strictly prefers to spend all his “ideological capital” in more inefficient policies (higher
rents) and win the election with some probability (less than one). In this sense, the
politician prefers a situation of political uncertainty with regard to the election out-
come as opposed to a situation of political certainty, so that we can say that political
uncertainty arises endogenously in the model 3.
Our model can also have a different interpretation. Political parties and electoral
systems are well-defined concepts of smoothly functioning democracies, but in many re-
gions of the world competing social groups vie for power and the control of government.
In some cases it is not clear who rules the country (economy) as political instability
means that the control of government changes hands frequently and unpredictably. Our
framework can provide some insight on such complex phenomena.
In such environments, we can interpret parties as social groups, which represent
different ideologies or social values, competing for the control of the government. The
super-majority requirement can alternatively be seen as the minimum number of sup-
porters that each side needs to consolidate its power and to remain unchallenged by the
competing group. If a group does not receive enough support to pass this exogenous
threshold, then it will prevail over its competitor only probabilistically. Political leaders
offer policy plans to civilians to attract them on their side and achieve political stabil-
ity, but their selfish incentives imply that they make inefficient proposals and prefer to
remain in the politically unstable region of competition.
Though it is not in our intention to present a complete theory of institutional in-
stability and regime shifts, our model generates a noteworthy prediction: the higher
the polarization or the super-majority requirement, the higher the degree of corruption
and social inefficiencies that will tend to prevail in a given society. This prediction is
consistent with the empirical observations from highly unstable regions, and especially
Africa (Levine, Easterly, 1997) 4.
The paper makes the following contributions: First, from a technical point of view,
we show that a Nash equilibrium exists even though voting is fully deterministic (in
the sense that we have described above) and there are more than one policy dimensions
(multi-dimensional setting). Many existing papers argue that probabilistic voting is
necessary for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in multi-dimensional policy environ-
ments, even though they allow for infinitely many voters 5. Therefore, our result reveals
that, if there are infinitely many agents (voters), the assumption of probabilistic voting
is redundant 6.
3In contrast, in models of stochastic voting it is not the politicians’ choice to win the election with
some probability. It is imposed to them by the structure of the model.
4See also Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999.
5The assumption of a continuity of agents (voters) ensures the continuity of the response functions
of politicians so that at least one Nash equilibrium of the voting game always exists, even if politi-
cal proposals are multi-dimensional. On the contrary, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) assume a finite
number of agents and therefore require probabilistic voting in order to ensure the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
6It should be stressed that the stochastic electoral rule that we use in our model is not a disguise for
stochastic voting. We have chosen this stochastic electoral rule because we want to treat the two parties
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Second, the introduction of deterministic voting allows us to derive an interesting
result. In our model, political uncerainty arises endogenously. A politician could have
won the election with certainty by making more concessions to voters, but instead he
prefers winning the election with some probability (less than one) because this strategy
implies higher expected rents for him.
Third, regarding empirical implications, the model generates three novel predictions:
i) political parties, which have greater ideological support, will tend to favor more
inefficient policies and foster greater corruption than those parties with little ideological
support, ii) the greater the asymmetry in the ideological adherence to parties, the
greater the difference in the proposed policies. To the best of our knowledge, these
predictions have not been empirically tested yet.
There exists, of course, a number of papers that is related to ours. Persson and
Tabellini (1999) study the effects of different electoral systems on political competition.
In their model voters exhibit ideological adherence to political parties and voting is
probabilistic. They show that majoritarian systems imply tougher competition and
hence lower political rents than proportional systems. This paper differs from theirs
in two respects. First, in our case, voting is fully deterministic. Second, we focus on
proportional systems, but we consider the effect of the number of extra votes a party
needs to form a government on political competition (and political rents) 7. Persson
and Tabellini (1999) do not consider this super-majority (extra votes) requirement,
which is observed in many proportional electoral systems. Our approach allows us to
establish a relation between the number of extra votes and political rents. A greater
super-majority requirement weakens political competition and results in higher political
rents.
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) construct a model with heterogeneous voter prefer-
ences and competition between parties over redistribution policies and show that who
wins the election depends on probabilistic behavior and parties may follow different
redistribution policies. Building on this, Coate and Morris (1995) show that when
politicians have private information over their types and over the value of the public
good, then redistribution policies can target special interests and be socially inefficient.
The model we propose can also replicate these results. If voters’ preferences are hetero-
geneous then parties will make different proposals, which will contain a degree of social
inefficiency.
symmetrically. In our model, a Nash equilibirum exists even if the electoral rule is deterministic and
the politicians can perfectly predict the number of votes they receive given their proposed platforms.
For more details see footnote 13 in p. 11
7In proportional systems the election outcome depends only on the aggregate number of votes as
opposed to majoritarian systems, where the outcome depends on the number of districts gained. In
many proportional systems the electoral rule is such that in order for the first party (in terms of votes
received) to form a government, a certain number of extra votes is required over the second party.
In our formal model this number of extra votes is captured by , which we call the super-majority
requirement. This is especially relevant in countries where at least three parties compete for gaining
power. Although in this version of the paper we do not consider the case of three or more parties, in
an extended version of the paper we have shown that our results go through even in this case.
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Helpman and Grossman (1996) are also concerned with political competition and
voting preferences in a two-party system, but their focus is mainly on special interests
groups and electoral contributions as a means of affecting political platforms (See also
Jackson and Kingdon, 1992, and Dixit and Londregan, 1996 on how special interests
may affect policy formation and efficiency). Though the terminology is different, one
could view contributions and corruption as two similar ways to express rents that politi-
cians receive in order to use their power and serve the interests of specific social groups.
An important assumption of their model, though, is that a subset of voters is relatively
uninformed over party platforms and could be persuaded to vote for one candidate or
the other if enough advertising takes place. In the absence of such a group, politicians
would receive no rents, as contributions would not have an impact on the probability
of election victory. On the other hand, if we were to allow for their structure to operate
on our environment then no inefficiency would arise, as the special groups with the
highest private value for the available funds (in our model the private and social values
coincide) would be the ones with the highest contributions to parties.
Our model differs from the aforementioned papers in two respects: First, in our case,
differences in platforms are due to different degrees of voters’ ideological adherence to
political parties. Second, we do not require any other friction (asymmetric information
or probabilistic voting) to derive inefficiencies or rents to politicians 8.
In summary, in this paper we derive the following results: First, on technical
grounds, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists even though voting is fully deter-
ministic and there are more than one policy dimensions (multi-dimensional setting).
Second, due to deterministic voting we are able to derive the following novel result: In
our model, political uncerainty arises endogenously. A politician could have won the
election with certainty by making more concessions to voters, but instead he prefers
winning the election with some probability (less than one) because this strategy im-
plies higher expected rents for him. Third, our model generates the following empirical
predictions: i) The higher the degree of ideological adherence, the higher the polit-
ical rents. This prediction is consistent with the empirical findings in Easterly and
Levine(1997) and Svensson (2005). These authors report that political polarization is
associated with less cost-efficient methods of production of public goods and is more
likely to lead to higher corruption in the economy. We share this prediction with Pers-
son and Tabellini (1999). ii) Another prediction in common with others (Coate and
Morris (1995), Helpman and Grossman (1996)),although for different reasons, is that in
equilibrium political platforms may be different. This prediction is consistent with the
8In a different context, Alesina, Rosenthal (2000) show how divergent political platforms can be
reconciled with political competition when institutional checks and balances imply that political par-
ties must eventually bargain over the policy to be executed. In their paper politicians prefer polarized
platforms because they give them greater flexibility and bargaining power in the negotiation stage. An-
ticipating that, voters understand that non-polarized proposals are not time consistent and hence vote
for their most preferred party. Our model also predicts polarized platforms in equilibrium, though our
focus is on the emergence of political rents and socially inefficient outcomes, rather on the asymmetries
between contesters.
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empirical findings in Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Snyder (1996). iii) The greater
the extra number of votes a party needs to form a government, the greater the political
rents. iv) Political parties, which have greater ideological support, will tend to favor
more inefficient policies and foster greater corruption than those parties with little ide-
ological support. v) The greater the asymmetry in the ideological adherence to parties,
the greater the difference in the proposed policies. To the best of our knowledge, the
last three predictions have not been empirically tested yet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of political competition between two parties when the ideological preferences of voters
are symmetric and derives a series of basic results. Section 3 generalizes the analysis
of the previous section to the case where some or all groups of voters have asymmetric
preferences over parties so that some party may be favored in a group over its rival.
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2 A symmetric model
The economy is assumed to last for a single period and consists of two basic categories
of agents: On one hand, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs, whose projects differ
with respect to their productivity. At the same time these entrepreneurs vote for the
politician they prefer to be in power and his respective policy. On the other hand,
there is a group of politicians, who propose several political measures and compete
to get elected and receive the power-related benefits. Entrepreneurs have different
preferred policies, according to their productivity, and different degrees of ideological
adherence to a certain politician or political party, which allows for inefficient policies
to be implemented and a certain degree of corruption to pertain in the economy. The
timing of the model is shown in the next figure.
Figure 1: Timing of events
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Entrepreneurs and Banks
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs in the interval [0,1] , who are divided
into groups (types) according to the quality of their projects. There exist 2 types
of entrepreneurs (projects), high quality (or efficient) projects (αH) and low quality
(inefficient) projects (αL), with respective proportions q and 1-q. Each project requires
an amount I of funds to start up, which will yield with certainty either αHI or αLI
after 1 period, depending on the type of project. We assume that αH > 1 > αL. The
quality of the project is publicly known and verifiable without any cost. Furthermore,
by running the project the entrepreneur receives an unobserved, private benefit b, which
has been deducted in the calculation of the net project-returns αHI and αLI.
Let λ denote the fraction of projects that can be undertaken by the available funds
(0 < λ 6 q). These funds are provided to the entrepreneurs through state-owned
banks, which do not operate exclusively under economic criteria, but are also subject
to pressures by the political party in power 910. Therefore the provision of funds for
all efficient projects is not guaranteed, since politicians have an incentive to channel a
part of the funds to low quality projects, from which they receive bribes (as long as
λ < q) 11.
If an inefficient project receives funds, after one period the entrepreneur will re-
pay back to the bank an amount rLI, which is determined by the politician, while the
residual return from the project (β = αL − rL) is repaid to the politician as a bribe.
This means that if some inefficient projects receive funds, banks cannot recover the
full amount of loans they provide to them and alternative means of financing are re-
quired through either taxation or higher repayment rates on good quality firms’ profits.
Since the politicians ultimately have the power to extract profits from high quality en-
trepreneurs through taxation, they allow public banks to compete with each other for
high quality projects, which makes high quality projects’ repayment equal to I, and use
taxation as the sole means of rent extraction.
9Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Dinc (2005) find that a significant portion of corruption transfers to
politicians in emerging markets takes place through public lending to politically connected firms, which
receive a premium rate compared to other borrowers. Our model is consistent with their empirical
observations as well.
10There is a growing body of empirical literature which relates corruption in developing countries
with the activities of politically connected firms and seeks to determine the factors behind it. As
example of this literature, see Mauro (1995), Svensson(1998, 2003), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Fisman
(2001), Alt and Lassen (2006) and Faccio (2006).
11Because we assume that all entrepreneurs receive the unobservable benefit b from running a project,
the social value of a high quality project will always be greater than the social value of a low quality
project: αHI + b > αLI + b. In this case, the condition λ 6 q implies that, because there are not
sufficient funds for all the high quality projects to be undertaken, it is always suboptimal to fund any
low quality project. We could relax this condition and let λ be any value less or equal to 1, as long as
another condition holds: αLI + b < I ⇔ b < (1 − αL)I, so that the social loss of lower productivity
exceeds the private benefit of the entrepreneur. If this condition holds, then financing any low quality
project is detrimental for social welfare. For reasons of expositional clarity, we stick to the former
condition, though our results would go through if we assume the latter.
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Politicians
There are two political players in this economy, P1 and P2, who can be interpreted
as major political parties or more accurately as key politicians. These two vie for the
control of the government. At the beginning of the period each one of them makes a
public proposal of his intended policies to the set of voters, who, according to their
preferences, choose who will govern. Once in government the elected politician has the
power to set taxation for firms and the ability to exert influence over the decisions of
the public banks on how to distribute the available funds for investment. If a certain
level of funds is provided to inefficient projects in exchange for political support, then
taxation is needed to cover the losses of banks.
The extent to which a politician can manipulate internal funds depends on the
restrictions on the mismanagement of state-owned banks and his ability to remain in
power despite these events. The assumption we maintain through out the rest of the
paper is that the politician has full discretion on how to allocate the available funds to
the two types of projects. This means that the politician can only take decisions that do
not lead state-owned banks to bankruptcy and this is a constraint he cannot manipulate.
In addition, politicians have the power to bargain with low quality entrepreneurs on
how the returns from their projects will be allocated between repayment to banks (rL)
and direct transfers to politicians (corruption bribes: β).
On the other hand, another set of restrictions is implicitly imposed by political
competition and the fact that a pure predatory behavior from the politician’s part is
unlikely to win him the election. More specifically, before the election takes place the
two politicians publicly announce the set of politically controlled variables, namely the
profit tax rate (t) and the number of efficient projects (sH) that will be funded. We
denote the political proposal by politician Pi as: P
R
i = {ti, siH}
An implicit element of the proposal is the level of funds the politician appropriates
from each low quality entrepreneur (βiI), which can be considered as a political bribe
or a reward for the politician for allowing inefficient projects to operate. This is never
part of the public announcement but, given the proposal and the information structure
of the environment, agents are able to infer the amount of proposed corruption as
well as the repayment rate for inefficient projects (rL) and the amount of low quality
entrepreneurs who will receive funds (sL). The total level of corruption in the economy
is the bribe received from each low quality entrepreneur times the number of inefficient
firms receiving funds: B = βsLI.
In this framework we assume that political announcements are credible and that
there are no commitment issues. Once in office, the politician implements his prede-
termined policy or otherwise he is thrown out of power and the other politician takes
over 12.
12We could alternatively obtain the same qualitative results by setting up a dynamic model with
reputation effects and politicians competing for power given their credibility. This would give a more
rigorous argument on why policies may be considered credible, but it would make the analysis much
more complex and mathematically demanding.
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Entrepreneurs as Voters
Entrepreneurs vote for their preferred candidate based on the expected utility they
will derive from his policies and their ideological adherence. Each politician represents
a specific ideology (ideology i for Pi and ideology j for Pj, which are fixed for each
politician), while voters have individual tastes which we assume that are uniformly
distributed over the interval [−M,M ] within each group of types of entrepreneurs. M
shows the degree of adherence to the ideology i, or, in other words, it is the relative
likeness or antipathy that an agent has to ideology i over j. We let the variable dik
denote the relative preference of agent k (k = {h, l}) for ideology i. By definition the
following equations hold:
dih ∼ Uni[−M,M ]
dil ∼ Uni[−M,M ]
dik = −djk
where the subscripts h and l denote an entrepreneur of a high or low quality project
respectively.
Figure 2: Ideological Distribution
Figure 2 shows the distribution of preferences for ideology i within each type of
voters. We assume that the utility, which an agent derives from supporting his preferred
ideology, is additively separable to the utility of expected wealth. The overall utility
for a voter, conditional on his type, his ideological profile and the policy proposition of
party i, is simply the sum of the expected profit and of his ideological adherence:
Uk(P
R
i ) = E(pi(P
R
i )) +
dik
2
For each type of agent utility can be written as:
Uh(P
R
i ) =
siH
q
[(αH − 1− ti)I + b] + d
i
h
2
(1)
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Ul(P
R
i ) =
siL
1− q b+
dil
2
(2)
The first multiplicative term is the probability of an entrepreneur to undertake the
project under the proposed policy and the second term is the income he would receive
in that case. The last term corresponds to the utility gain attached to ideological voting.
From the above equations and the fact that dik = −djk follows that an agent will
vote for politician Pi (denoted as: v
i
k = 1) iff:
Uk(P
R
i ) > Uk(P
R
j )⇔ E(pik(PRi ))− E(pik(PRj )) + dik > 0 (3)
Elections and Politicians
Let V i be the total votes that Pi receives. In order to win the election we assume that
the politician must receive a critical mass of  votes more than his competitor, where
 can be an interval arbitrarily small. If Pi receives less votes than Pj by a difference
at least as large as  then he loses the election, while if the difference is less than this
threshold, he loses the election with only a probability equal to 1
2
13. The election rule
is then specified as:
piwin = 1, if V
i − V j > 
piwin =
1
2
, if − < V i − V j <  and
piwin = 0, if V
i − V j 6 −
The critical mass of voters  is an important parameter of the problem at study. In
many proportional systems the electoral rule is such that in order for the first party
(in terms of votes received) to form a government, a certain number of extra votes
13It should be stressed that the stochastic electoral rule that we use in our model is not a disguise
for stochastic voting. We have chosen this stochastic electoral rule because we want to treat the two
parties symmetrically. To see this, suppose there are two parties, A and B. Consider the following
election rule: Party B wins the election with certainty only if it gains a mass of  votes more than party
A. That is party A wins the election with certainty in all of the following cases: i) if party A receives
more votes than party B, ii) if it receives the same mass of votes as B, iii) if party A receives less
votes than B, but the difference is no more than . In this case, in equilibrium, party B will propose
a platform implying zero rents for itself and party A will propose a platform implying that it receives
exactly a mass e of votes less than party B and strictly positive political rents. Also, in equilibrium
party A wins the election with certainty. Clearly, now, everything in our model is fully deterministic
(including the election rule) and still equilibrium exists. In fact, the existence of the equilibrium is not
related to stochastic voting or a stochastic election rule. Also, it does not depend on . The only role
of  is to insure that political rents arise in equilibrium. If this  is zero, then equilibrium still exists
but political rents are also zero. Some papers argue that stochastic voting is required for the existence
of an equilibrium, even if there is a continuum of voters. This argument is not quite right. In these
papers stochastic voting is only needed for having an equilibrium with strictly positive political rents.
However, if the number of voters is finite, then stochastic voting is indeed required for the existence
of an equilibrium.
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is required over the second party. In our formal model this number of extra votes is
captured by , which we call the super-majority requirement. This is especially relevant
in countries where at least three parties compete for gaining power 14. Higher values
of this parameter mean that politicians need a higher majority to secure election and
distort their proposals toward more inefficient policies.
Given the above specifications of the economy, politicians try to maximize their
expected wealth, which consists of the appropriated part of the low projects returns:
maxUp(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = p
i
winB
γ
i
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion for politicians (0 6 γ 6 1). Politicians
essentially try to maximize the expected appropriation of funds under the limitations
that they have been imposed to them:
–the allocation of funds condition: (
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (4)
(the available funds for investment can either be invested in efficient projects or
inefficient ones)
–the allocation of inefficient projects’ returns:
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (5)
–the profitability of public banks condition:
rLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI −B > λI (6)
(the sum of the repayments by inefficient and efficient projects and aggregate
taxation must be at least equal to the initial funds available for investment)
–the Election Rule and the commitment of execution of proposed policies.
In terms of mathematical expressions, each candidate tries to solve the following
problem (P.1):
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = p
i
winB
γ
i s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI
(siH + s
i
L) I 6 λI
14Although in this version of the paper we do not consider the case of three or more parties, in an
extended version of the paper we have shown that our results go through even in this case.
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βi + r
i
L 6 αL
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1
piwin = 1, if V
i − V j > , piwin = 12 , if − 6 V i − V j 6 , piwin = 0, if V i − V j 6 −
Monopoly of Power Solution
As a benchmark case, it is interesting to study the autocratic case, where there is only
one politician and whose power remains undisputed for all possible policies that do not
violate the public banks’ profitability condition. The solution to this problem will be
used later on as a comparison base for the results under political competition.
If we were to assume that there is a dictator in the economy, whose power is unchal-
lenged, then we implicitly impose that the politician does not face the fear of losing his
position through elections and hence it would be equivalent to imposing the condition
pwin = 1 to P.1. In other words, under the assumption of autocracy, P.1 is transformed
into (P.1a):
max
sH ,sL,t,β,rL
Up = B
γ s.t.
B = βsLI
(sH + sL) I 6 λI
β + rL 6 αL
rLsLI + sHI + tsHI > λI
0 6 t 6 αH − 1
The above problem is easy to solve. First, notice that all inequalities will hold with
equality in the final solution. If that was not the case, the politician would always
increase his utility by increasing either the share of inefficient projects which receive
funds or the level of the bribe until the restrictions are satisfied with equality15.
Keeping this in mind and by recursively substituting these conditions into the utility
function we can rewrite the problem as an unconstrained one:
max
rL,t
Up =
[
(αL − rL)
(
λt
1+t−rL
)
I
]γ
s.t.
15A mathematical way to verify this is to set the Langrangian for the maximization problem and
then show that all Langrange multipliers are strictly positive so that the constraints are binding.
13
β = αL − rL
sH = λ− sL
sL =
λt
1+t−rL
0 6 t 6 αH − 1
By taking first order conditions with respect to rL and t, we get the following ex-
pressions 16:
∂U
∂rL
= −λtI
1+t−rL −
(αL−rL)(−λtI)
(1+t−rL)2 =
−λtI(1+t−rL)+(αL−rL)λtI
(1+t−rL)2 =
λtI(αL−1−t)
(1+t−rL)2 < 0
and
∂U
∂t
= (αL − rL)I λ(1+t−rL)−λt(1+t−rL)2 = (αL − rL)I
λ(1−rL)
(1+t−rL)2 > 0
The above conditions imply that in order the politician to maximize his utility he
must set the inefficient projects’ repayment as low as possible and the tax rate as high
as possible. The full set of the monopoly of power solution is:
rL = 0, β = αL, t = αH − 1, sL = λ(αH − 1)
αH
, sH =
λ
αH
and Ump =
[
λαL(αH−1)I
αH
]γ
As expected, the dictator, since he does not face any real threat to his power, sets
taxation for efficient projects to its maximum possible level, expropriating all their
profits, imposes no repayment to inefficient entrepreneurs, in order to receive maximum
possible bribes, and balances the proportion of high and low quality projects financed
so as to maximize his wellbeing.
This is a straightforward result that shows the degree of inefficiency and corruption
that is generated by autocratic regimes in the particular set up of our model and we
will regularly refer back to it for comparison purposes.
Political Equilibrium
We now return to the case of political competition between two candidates. Their
power is not unchecked, but subject to the constraints imposed by the political game
as described earlier. If a politician tries to maximize his own wellbeing, as a dictator
16Because Up
1
γ is a monotonic transformation of Up, both of them have their maximum for the
same values of rL and t. For simplification reasons, we derive the first order conditions of the former
expression.
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would do, then he will be undercut by his competitor, who will offer a more attractive
option to voters and will win the election.
But winning the election is costly itself. If the two politicians make exactly the
same political proposal to voters then none of them would win with certainty. Since
ideological dispersion is symmetric by assumption, half of the agents would vote for
either politician. We call the set of voters who vote for one politician over another,
when both of them offer the same proposal, as the natural support group, because of
their exogenous ideological preference.
If a rival wants to win the election with certainty, a required mass of  voters is
required and these voters have already a certain degree of ideological adherence to
the other candidate. In order to win their votes a politician will have to offer greater
concessions to them in terms of political proposal than what he would have offered
to his own supporters and this cost is increasing in relative terms as the concessions
required for election victory increase. Therefore there is a cut-off point, which makes
politicians indifferent between winning elections or sticking to their support group and
taking over power with probability 1
2
. Given the above intuition, the rest of this section
is focused on providing a diagrammatic and analytical exposition of the solution of the
political game and the main arguments behind the results.
First, we try to describe the set of political proposals for politician Pi, which win
him the election for a specific proposal by Pj and then compare the utility from winning
an election with the utility from playing the same strategy as the opponent and win-
ning with probability 1
2
. Essentially, the political contestants have 2 different strategies.
They can either try to win the election, which implies a relative benefit from the cer-
tainty of rising into power and a relative cost in terms of higher concessions to voters,
or they can mimic their opponent in terms of proposal and wait for luck to determine
who gets the power.
If a politician mimics his opponent, then he will receive 1−q
2
votes from entrepreneurs
with low quality projects and q
2
votes from entrepreneurs with high quality projects,
for a total of 1
2
. If, on the other hand, Pi deviates, he requires at least
1+
2
votes to
win the election 17. The amount of extra low quality voters he will receive from such a
deviation (which can also be negative) is:
(siL−s
j
L
)b
1−q
M
1−q
2
.
(siL−sjL)b
1−q denotes the excess monetary utility low quality entrepreneurs will receive
by Pi’s proposal and when divided by M it denotes the proportion of inefficient en-
trepreneurs for whom the differential monetary utility exceeds their ideological adher-
ence. Of course, in order to be consistent, we assume that −M 6 (siL−s
j
L)b
1−q 6 M since
the fraction of the two values can not exceed 1. (1−q)
2
is the amount of voters who can
be attracted from or lost to the opponent. The total expression can be rewritten as
(siL−sjL)b
2M
and, by including the natural supporters, the total number of inefficient type
voters is:
17Recall that if i receives an number of 2 extra votes by changing his proposal, his opponent loses
these votes, so that the total vote difference is equal to 
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V il (P
R
i , P
R
j ) =
(1− q)
2
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
Similarly the amount of extra high quality voters a politician can receive by PRi 6= PRj
is
siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
2M
, while the total number of efficient type voters is:
V ih(P
R
i , P
R
j ) =
q
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
All this implies that the total support politician Pi should expect is equal to:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
If he were to win, then the following condition should be satisfied:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
> 1 + 
2
(7)
Essentially, if the politician were to win the election he should solve the modified
problem P.1 with the addition of condition (7)(problem P.1b):
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI
(siH + s
i
L) I 6 λI
βi + r
i
L 6 αL
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI
siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
2M
+
(siL−sjL)b
2M
> 
2
−M 6 (siL−s
j
L)b
1−q 6M
16
−M 6 siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
q
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
q
6M
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1
The solution to this problem is provided below18:
β˜ = αL, r˜L = 0, t˜i =
αHλI
λI+M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I
− 1,
s˜iL =
λ(αH−1)I−(M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I)
αHI
s˜iH =
λI+M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I
αHI
The above variables comprise the elements of the politician’s proposal which, given
his opponent’s proposal, maximize his utility under the condition that he wins the elec-
tion with certainty. We denote this proposal as P˜Ri . The associated utility level from
this proposal is expressed as:
U˜p = B˜
γ
i =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
The above expression is very intuitive. The first term is the utility the politician
would get if he was a dictator. The second term reflects the utility loss the politician
must suffer in order to win the election and it is decreasing in sjH . The more funds
Pj provides to efficient projects, and hence the less corrupt he is, the greater are the
concessions Pi has to make to secure victory.
This is not his best response function however. The politician might do better by
mimicking his opponent’s proposal and not suffering the cost of higher concessions to
voters. In order to verify if this is the case, the politician needs also to solve P.1 under
the slightly modified condition:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
⇔ 1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
=
1
2
Of course, the above condition implies that: siH = s
j
H , s
i
L = s
j
L, ti = tj which means
that Pi mimics Pj’s proposal. In that case Pi’s utility would be:
18The derivation of the solution is provided in Appendix A.
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Up =
1
2
Bγi =
1
2
(βis
i
LI)
γ =
1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ 19
Therefore, Pi prefers to win the election with probability
1
2
to a certain victory if
and only if:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ >
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
⇔ sjL 6
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
20
The above condition sets a critical level for the strategies Pi will play. If his opponent
chooses sjL above this value, then Pi prefers to compete aggressively and win the election,
while if it is below this value then he prefers to make exactly the same proposal as the
other politician and at least get 1
2
chance of gaining power. But he would never choose
to opt for high values of corruption and lose all chances of being elected, since, by
the assumptions of the model, the only way he can gain some utility is through the
potential bribes that come along with power.
Because of the symmetry of the political game, of course, Pj faces a similar condition
and the same strategic issues:
siL 6
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
Hence, the unique equilibrium of the game is:
siL = s
j
L =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
The two politicians mimic each other’s proposals and chance determines who gets
elected to power. If one of them deviates from this equilibrium and increases taxation
by even an infinitesimal amount, the other one can do better by decreasing it and win-
ning election for sure. On other hand, none of them has an incentive to decrease the
level of funds that goes to low quality projects as winning the election with certainty, in
19It is very easy to verify that if Pi mimics his opponent then his best response is to set βi = αL, by
following exactly the same method as we did in the Appendix A for the case of pure election victory.
20The derivation of this inequality is included in Appendix A.
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this case, lowers the politician’s utility when compared with the utility level he derives
by mimicking his opponent’s proposal. Therefore the symmetric equilibrium of this
political game can be fully described as:
βi = βj = αL, r
i
L = r
j
L = 0, s
i
L = s
j
L =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHI
,
siH = s
j
H = λ− 2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHI
, ti = tj =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHλI−2
1
γM
The equilibrium utility level politicians receive is:
U∗p =
1
2
[
2
1
γ
2
1
γ − 1
αL
αH
M
]γ
Figure 3: Political Equilibria under Monopoly and Competition
The equilibrium is also represented diagrammatically in Figure 3. It is drawn in
the {t, sL} space and utility increases for the politician as t and sL increase. The
sL =
λt
1+t
curve corresponds to the level of low quality projects that can be undertaken
as a function of the tax rate when the condition β = αL holds. It represents the
profitability of banks condition (6) and shows the maximum number of low quality
projects that can be financed for each level of taxation so that public banks do not go
bankrupt.
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Point A stands for the autocratic case, when the politician faces no challenges to
his power and hence he can set the maximum possible tax in order to fund as many
low quality projects as possible and reap the maximum level of bribes. On the other
hand, point B in the diagram shows the case of political competition. Due to the fear
of losing the election, politicians must provide some concessions to voters in terms of
lower inefficiencies in the economy and lower corruption.
However, the level of corruption that will prevail in the economy depends on the
degree of ideological adherence and the necessary majority to consolidate power. So long
as M and  are sufficiently small, the cost of undermining a political opponent remains
less than the benefit of winning the election and political competition has a bite on
lowering the expropriating power of politicians. Specifically, a necessary condition for
lower corruption under political competition than the autocratic case is:
s∗L 6 smL ⇔
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
6 λ(αH − 1)
αH
⇔M 6
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
λ(αH − 1)I
2
1
γ
(8)
The left hand side of (8) represents the cost the politician must suffer in order to
win the election, while the right side is the perceived benefit: the total profits that
would be generated in the economy if all efficient projects were undertaken weighted
by the increase in probability of winning the election and the degree of risk aversion of
the politician 21.
If  = 0 or M = 0, then attracting voters is unnecessary or costless for political vic-
tory so that there is perfect political competition and the economy can achieve the first
best, where there is no corruption and only high quality entrepreneurs receive funds.
On the other hand, if condition (8) is violated, then essentially the cost of political com-
petition is so high that politicians can act unchallenged and impose political proposals
that replicate the monopoly of power case. In other words, economies with higher de-
gree of polarization or greater political instability, which require increased majorities
for the implementation of power, give greater power to politicians to act according to
their best interest and face the risk of higher inefficiencies and corruption.
Also, the degree of risk aversion of the politician works in favor of efficiency. The
more risk averse the politicians are the more they seek to secure victory in elections
and hence the greater the degree of political competition. As a result, the number of
efficient projects funded and the implied level of corruption decrease on their political
proposals.
In summary, in this section we derived the following results: First, we show that a
Nash equilibrium exists even though voting is fully deterministic and there are more
than one policy dimensions (multi-dimensional setting). Second, the greater the degree
21Notice that if γ = 1, then
(
2
1
γ −1
)
2
1
γ
= 12 .
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of ideological adherence of voters the greater the political rents. This prediction is con-
sistent with the empirical findings in Easterly and Levine(1997) and Svensson (2005).
These authors report that political polarization is associated with less cost-efficient
methods of production of public goods and is more likely to lead to higher corruption
in the economy. We share this prediction with Persson and Tabellini (1999). Third,
the higher the number of extra votes required for election victory (the higher the ) the
higher the degree of corruption. The latter prediction is novel and, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been tested yet.
3 An Asymmetric Political Game
We now retain the framework as it was in the previous section, but generalize it to in-
clude different degrees of ideological adherence for each politician and within each type
of entrepreneurs. More specifically, we assume that ideology is uniformly distributed
over the interval [Mh,Mh] for the high quality group of entrepreneurs and over the
interval [Ml,Ml] for the low quality entrepreneurs. In terms of notation:
dih ∼ Uni[Mh,Mh]
dil ∼ Uni[Ml,Ml]
Figure 4: Ideological Distribution under Asymmetry
An example of such a distribution can also be shown in Figure 4. The rest of the
elements of the model remain the same as in section 1. Politicians, once again, compete
with each other in terms of political proposals in an attempt to be elected into power.
The main strategies they can use to achieve this also remain the same. They can
either try to secure victory through greater concessions or they may opt to mimic their
opponent. However, this generalization allows us to obtain new insights.
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The main difference in the asymmetric environment is that mimicking does not mean
offering the same political proposal anymore. Since the degree of ideological adherence
varies among voters, the two politicians may not have equal chances of being elected if
they follow the same policies. If the degree of ideological asymmetry is strong enough,
then one politician may have sufficient mass of voters to win the election with certainty
even if he makes a slightly different proposal than his competitor.
Assuming, for the rest of the analysis, that the natural supporters for politician Pi
have ideological adherence distributed over [0,Mk] (the rest support Pj), the number
of voters that will actually vote for Pi, depending on both political programs, can be
expressed as:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
Mh
Mh−Mh q+
Ml
Ml−Ml (1− q) +
siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
Mh−Mh −
sjH [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
Mh−Mh +
(siL−sjL)b
Ml−Ml
The first two terms represent the number of natural supporters for Pi, while the rest of
the terms show the extra number of voters the politician can gain from both groups of
entrepreneurs through his policy.
The conditions for the politician to draw or win an election, respectively, remain:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
(9)
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) >
1 + 
2
(10)
The politician will decide which strategy to follow, depending on the utility he
would receive by doing so. If Pi were to guarantee election victory then his best re-
sponse to his opponent’s proposal would be (letMH = Mh−Mh andML = Ml−Ml) 22:
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I, then:
siL = s
j
L −
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (11)
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I, then:
siL = s
j
L +
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (12)
If he were to draw instead, his best response to his opponent’s proposal would be:
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I, then:
siL = s
j
L −
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (13)
22See also Appendix B
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if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I, then:
siL = s
j
L +
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (14)
In a similar fashion, Pj’s strategies as a response to his opponent’s proposal would
be:
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I, then:
sjL = s
i
L −
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (15)
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I, then:
sjL = s
i
L +
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (16)
for the case of victory, while for the case of draw:
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I, then:
sjL = s
i
L −
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (17)
if
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I, then:
sjL = s
i
L +
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (18)
Therefore, the asymmetric political game has two equilibria, depending on a single
condition.
Case 1:
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I
In this case the cost of high quality supporters relative to low quality, reflected by the
left hand side of the inequality, is lower than the extra benefit these supporters can
provide the politician in terms of higher efficiency and greater profits in the economy.
Both politicians prefer to compete for the support of the high quality group in the
economy, irrespective of their natural support group, and they adopt policies that
reduce inefficiency and corruption. Notice that, if MH = ML = 2M , which corresponds
to the symmetric game, this condition would always hold, so that the problem of section
1 is a special case of this case.
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Both of them face a threshold value of inefficient projects their opponent is propos-
ing, below which they would prefer not to directly compete for victory, but to draw
the election. This value, however, varies between the two politicians, depending on
their natural support groups and determines a relative bargaining power in terms of
aggressiveness. The threshold value for politician Pi and Pj respectively is:
sjL
∗ 6
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b +
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) ( MHML
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
)
(19)
siL
∗ 6
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b +
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) ( MHML
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
)
(20)
The politician who has the strongest support groups has more to gain from a victory
than his opponent and so he is more willing to win, even for proposals of his competitor
with so low inefficiency, that if the other politician were in his position he would not
accept.
For expositional reasons, let’s assume that Pi has greater natural support groups,
so that sjL
∗
< siL
∗
. The following diagram depicts the strategic situation:
Figure 5: Critical Values Comparison
If both contestants make proposals above siL
∗
then they would prefer to deviate,
propose lower inefficiency in the economy and win elections with certainty. Once Pj
reaches his critical value, however, he prefers the more defensive strategy of winning the
election with probability 1
2
, while his opponent continues to deviate. The equilibrium
of the game is reached when Pj offers s
j
L
∗
and Pi offers:
siL = s
j
L
∗ − 12MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b ⇒
siL =
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) ( MHML
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
)
(21)
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At this point, none of the contestants has an incentive to deviate, since this would
decrease his payoff without increasing his chances of victory. Notice also that we have
assumed that Pi has a larger group of natural supporters. This means that:
Mh
MH
q + Ml
ML
(1− q) > 1
2
⇔MLMhq +MHMl(1− q) > 12MHML ⇔
1
2
MHML −MLMhq −MHMl(1− q) < 0
In other words, the equilibrium political proposal of Pi contains greater inefficiency
than the equilibrium proposal of his opponent, which reflects the relative superiority of
his bargaining position. Since the politician with the greater support worries less about
the possibility to lose the election, he can reap greater benefits for himself than his
opponent. Hence, at equilibrium there are two different proposals, one more efficient
than the other, and politicians face the same probability of gaining power. In either
case rL = 0, β = αL while the taxation rate under the politician with greater support
is higher than the taxation of the other 23.
This result also highlights another interesting implication of our model. The politi-
cian with the greater support group could have won the election with certainty while
retaining some rents if he were willing to propose a more efficient policy. However, he
prefers more rents and winning the election with probability one half. What makes this
result interesting is that, due to deterministic voting, in our model political instability
arises endogenously.
Case 2:
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I
This is the opposite case. The relative cost of high quality supporters outweighs the
extra benefit, so that both politicians prefer to compete for the support of the low
quality group. They achieve that by making offers with greater extent of taxation and
funding for inefficient projects. The threshold value for the two politicians under this
case is:
sjL
∗
=
λ(αH − 1)
αH − αL −
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b −
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) [ MHML
(MH −ML)b
]
(22)
siL
∗
=
λ(αH − 1)
αH − αL −
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b −
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) [ MHML
(MH −ML)b
]
(23)
23Recall that at equilibrium t = sLλ−sL
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Now the politician with the larger support group is the one with the highest thresh-
old value, as the competition takes place in terms of more inefficiency rather than less,
which was the previous case. Assuming that Pi has a larger support group, the game
reaches equilibrium when Pj offers s
j
L
∗
and Pi offers:
siL = s
j
L
∗
+
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b ⇒
siL =
λ(αH − 1)
αH − αL −
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) [ MHML
(MH −ML)b
]
Notice that, in this case, the entrepreneur with the greater group of natural sup-
porters makes more efficient proposals than his opponent, in the sense that he proposes
to fund a smaller number of low quality projects. This result, however, is not surpris-
ing. Given that political competition is distorted in such a way, so that all profits from
high quality projects are taxed, the real trade-off is the way this surplus will be divided
between the politician in power and low quality entrepreneurs. The politician who has
more supporters is also the one with higher degree of bargaining power, so that he has
equal chances of winning the election even if he promises a smaller share of the surplus
to entrepreneurs with inefficient projects than his opponent. Under this perspective,
his proposal is closer to the policy that a selfish dictator would impose, as described in
section 2. Nevertheless, from a societal point of view he would seem as a more efficient
candidate.
This is an interesting case on its own right, because it exemplifies a situation where
ideological adherence not only creates inefficiencies in the economy, but also distorts
the field of competition from the high quality entrepreneurs to the low quality ones,
increasing even more the degree of corruption in equilibrium. It also affects politicians
strategies so that those, who receive relatively greater support by voters, make more
efficient proposals than the rest. This case is more relevant in countries where the legal
protection of outside investors is weak and hence the private benefits for entrepreneurs
are high (high b).
In summary, the introduction of asymmetry in ideological adherence gives rise to
the following predictions: First, in equilibrium political platforms are different. We
share this prediction with others (Coate and Morris (1995), Helpman and Grossman
(1996)),although for different reasons. This is consistent with the empirical findings in
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Snyder (1996). Second, the greater the asymmetry in
the ideological adherence to parties, the greater the difference in the proposed policies.
Third, political parties, which have greater ideological support, will tend to favor more
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inefficient policies and foster greater corruption than those parties with little ideolog-
ical support. To the best of our knowledge, the last two predictions have not been
empirically tested yet.
Conclusion
There is a number of points this paper is trying to make, which we draw as our final
conclusions. First, on theoretical grounds we show that a Nash equilibrium exists even
though voting is fully deterministic and there are more than one policy dimensions.
Many existing papers argue that probabilistic voting is necessary for the existence of
a Nash equilibrium in multi-dimensional policy environments, even though they allow
for infinitely many voters. Our result reveals that, if there are infinitely many agents,
the assumption of probabilistic voting is redundant for the existence of a Nash equi-
librium or political rents. Institutional frictions, associated with electoral rules along
with ideological adherence to parties, can equally well create suitable environments for
political opportunism and inefficient social policies.
Second, deterministic voting allows us to derive another interesting result. In equi-
librium, parties generally win the elections probabilistically, even if political proposals
exist that could ensure victory for a party with certainty. This means that uncertainty
over the results of an election is endogenously determined by the nature of political
competition and the cost of luring supporters from the opposition.
Third, the higher the number of extra votes required for election victory (the higher
the ) the higher the degree of corruption. Fourth, parties who have the highest degree
of societal support will tend to favor more inefficient policies than less well supported
groups. In other words, politicians will capitalize on their favorable situation to extract
as many political rents as possible. These two predictions are novel and, to the best of
our knowledge, have not been tested yet.
Fifth, the greater the degree of ideological adherence of voters the greater the po-
litical rents. This prediction is consistent with the empirical findings in Easterly and
Levine(1997) and Svensson (2005). These authors report that political polarization is
associated with less cost-efficient methods of production of public goods and is more
likely to lead to higher corruption in the economy. We share this prediction with Persson
and Tabellini (1999).
Sixth, political competition does not necessarily lead to convergence of political
platforms. If political preferences over social groups are unevenly distributed, then
political platforms will be radically different. This is consistent with the empirical
findings in Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Snyder (1996).
Our model can be extended in a number of interesting ways. First, the entrepreneurs’
private benefit can be reduced by strengthening the legal protection for outside in-
vestors. Of course, this is a political decision and can be derived as the outcome of the
political game. Second, the degree of ideological adherence can be also endogenized.
Because a higher degree of ideological adherence leads to higher political rents, through
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campaigns, politicians may increase polarization and hence strengthen their bargaining
position. We are currently working on the first issue, while we leave the second one for
future research.
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Appendix A
Solution to problem P.1b
Given that Pi wants to win the election with certainty, he solves the problem:
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i (24)
s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI (25)
(
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (26)
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (27)
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI (28)
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
> 
2
(29)
−M 6 (s
i
L − sjL)b
1− q 6M (30)
−M 6 s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
q
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
q
6M (31)
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1 (32)
Using the same type of argument as in the monopoly of power case, it is obvious
that constraints (26), (27), (28) and (29) of this maximization problem will hold with
equality at the solution. Otherwise the politician can do better by changing one of the
variables of the problem and receiving strictly higher utility. First, condition (29) can
be written:
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
=

2
⇔
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]− sjH [(αH − 1− tj)I + b] + (siL − sjL)b = M⇔
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siH(αH − 1− ti)I + siHb+ siLb = M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I + sjHb+ sjLb
But now notice that, since siHb+s
i
Lb = s
j
Hb+s
j
Lb = λb, the last equation is equivalent
to:
siH(αH − 1− ti)I = M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I (33)
Now let M(sjH , tj) = M
∗ = M + sjH(αH − 1 − tj)I. Since the politician can not
directly affect his opponents’ choice variables, they are considered as exogenous from
his point of view, so that M∗ is treated as a constant in his maximization problem. So:
siH(αH − 1− ti)I = M∗ (34)
By (26) and (34):
(λ− siL)(αH − 1− ti)I = M∗ ⇔ (λ− siL)(αH − 1)I − (λ− siL)tiI = M∗ ⇔
ti = αH − 1− M
∗
(λ− siL)I
(35)
Also, by substituting (26) and (27) into (28) and solving for βi we get the following
expression:
(αL − βi)siL + (1 + ti)(λ− siL) = λ⇔ αLsiL − βisiL + λ+ λti − (1 + ti)siL = λ⇔
λti + (αL − 1− ti)siL = βisiL ⇔ βi = (αL − 1− ti) +
λti
siL
(36)
and by (35):
βi =
(
αL − 1− αH + 1 + M
∗
(λ− siL)I
)
+
λ
(
αH − 1− M∗(λ−siL)I
)
siL
⇔
βi =
(αL − αH)(λ− siL)I +M∗
(λ− siL)I
+
λ
(αH−1)(λ−siL)I−M∗
(λ−siL)I
siL
⇔
βi =
(αL − αH)(λ− siL)IsiL +M∗siL
(λ− siL)IsiL
+
λ(αH − 1)(λ− siL)I − λM∗
(λ− siL)IsiL
⇔
βi = −(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
(37)
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Using equations (25) and (37) we substitute back to the objective function to rewrite
it as a function of only one choice variable:
max
siL
Bγi =
(
βis
i
LI
)γ
=
[(
−(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
)
siLI
]γ
= [−(αH − αL)siLI + (αH − 1)λI −M∗]γ
Since the objective function is monotonic in γ, the maximum of the above expression
is attained at the same level of siL as the maximum of Bi. The F.O.C. for this simpler
problem is:
∂Bi
∂siL
= −(αH − αL)I < 0, since αH > αL, I > 0
This implies that the politician must reduce siL as much as possible in order to
maximize his own utility, and this holds irrespectively of the political proposal of the
opponent. Notice that, by equation (37), as siL decreases βi increases (and also notice
that because ti > 0, it must hold that λ(αH − 1)I − M∗ > 0, by equation (35)).
Therefore, the minimum possible level for siL is the one that makes βi the maximum
possible. This implies that at the optimum βi = αL. By using equation (37) once more
we get the solution for siL:
αL = −(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
⇔ 0 = −αH + λ(αH − 1)I −M
∗
siLI
⇔
siL =
λ(αH − 1)I −M∗
αHI
(38)
And, by (35):
ti = αH − 1− M
∗
(λ− siL)I
⇔ ti = αH − 1− M
∗(
λ− λ(αH−1)I−M∗
αHI
)
I
⇔
ti = αH − 1− M
∗(
λαHI−λαHI+λI+M∗
αHI
)
I
⇔ ti = αH − 1− αHM
∗
λI +M∗
⇔
ti =
αHλI
λI +M∗
− 1 (39)
In order to complete the solution, note that βi = αL ⇒ rL = 0 and that:
siH = λ− siL ⇒ siH = λ−
λ(αH − 1)I −M∗
αHI
⇔ siH =
λI +M∗
αHI
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The utility the politician will derive by winning the elections as a response to his
opponent’s proposal is:
B˜γi = (βis
i
LI)
γ =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
M∗
]γ
⇒
B˜γi =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
If the politician decides to mimic he gets utility (see also the political equilibrium
section of the paper):
Up =
1
2
Bγi =
1
2
(βis
i
LI)
γ =
1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ
Politician decides not to pursue victory iff:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ >
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ ⇔
αLs
j
LI > 2
1
γ
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ (λ− sjL)(αH − 1− tj)I
)]
At this point notice that, since the problem is symmetric, Pj will also set βj = αL
in order to maximize his utility irrespectively of what Pi will do and by equation (36)
we have:
αL = (αL − 1− tj) + λtj
sjL
⇔ 1 + tj = λtj
sjL
⇔ sjL = λtj − sjLtj ⇔ tj =
sjL
λ− sjL
(40)
We use this into the preceding expression:
sjLI > 2
1
γ
[
(αH − 1)λI
αH
− 1
αH
(
M+ (λ− sjL)
(
αH − 1− s
j
L
λ− sjL
)
I
)]
⇔
sjL > 2
1
γ
λ(αH − 1)
αH
− 2 1γ M
αHI
− 2 1γ λ(αH − 1)
αH
+ 2
1
γ
(αH − 1)
αH
sjL + 2
1
γ
1
αH
sjL ⇔
sjL > −2
1
γ
M
αHI
+ 2
1
γ sjL ⇔
(
1− 2 1γ
)
sjL > −2
1
γ
M
αHI
⇔
sjL 6
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) M
αHI
(41)
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Appendix B
Solution to problem P.1b under asymmetry
We follow the same procedure as in the symmetric case. If Pi wants to win the election
then he needs to solve the modified problem P.2:
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i (42)
s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI (43)
(
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (44)
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (45)
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI (46)
Mh
Mh −Mh
q+
Ml
Ml −Ml
(1−q)+s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
Mh −Mh
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
Mh −Mh
+
(siL − sjL)b
Ml −Ml
> 1 + 
2
(47)
−Ml 6 (s
i
L − sjL)b
1− q 6Ml (48)
−Mh 6 s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
q
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
q
6Mh (49)
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1 (50)
Let Mh −Mh = MH and Ml −Ml = ML. Taking into account that at equilibrium
inequalities (44),(45),(46),(47) will hold with equality, (47) can be rewritten as:
Mh
MH
q+
Ml
ML
(1−q)+s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
MH
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
MH
+
(siL − sjL)b
ML
=
1 + 
2
⇔
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MhMLq +MlMH(1− q) +MLsiH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]−MLsjH [(αH − 1− tj)I + b] +
MH(s
i
L − sjL)b = 1+2 MHML ⇔
MLs
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]−MLsjH [(αH − 1− tj)I + b] +MH(siL − sjL)b = E
where : E =
1 + 
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q) (51)
By using (44):
ML(λ−siL)[(αH−1−ti)I+b]−ML(λ−sjL)[(αH−1−tj)I+b]+MH(siL−sjL)b = E ⇔
−MLλtiI + (MH −ML)bsiL −MLsiL(αH − 1 − ti)I + MLλtjI − (MH −ML)bsjL +
MLs
j
L(αH − 1− tj)I = E ⇔
−MLλtiI−MLsiL(αH−1−ti)I+(MH−ML)bsiL = E−MLλtjI−MLsjL(αH−1−tj)I+(MH−ML)bsjL
(52)
Let : Z(tj, s
j
L) = Z = E −MLλtjI −MLsjL(αH − 1− tj)I + (MH −ML)bsjL (53)
Then:
−MLλtiI −MLsiL(αH − 1− ti)I + (MH −ML)bsiL = Z (54)
Solving (54) for ti we get:
ti =
Z + [MLI(αH − 1)− (MH −ML)b]siL
−MLI(λ− siL)
⇒
ti =
Z +ΘsiL
−MLI(λ− siL)
(55)
where,Θ = MLI(αH − 1)− (MH −ML)b (56)
Also, by using (44),(45) and (46):
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI = λI ⇔ (αL − βi)siLI + (λ− siL)(1 + ti)I = λI ⇔
αLs
i
L − βisiL + (λ− siL)ti − siL = 0
34
Substituting the value of ti, by (55), in the above expression:
(αL − 1)siL − βisiL + (λ− siL)
Z +ΘsiL
−MLI(λ− siL)
= 0⇔
βis
i
L = (αL − 1)siL −
Θ
MLI
siL −
Z
MLI
⇔ (57)
βis
i
LI = (αL − 1)IsiL −
Θ
ML
siL −
Z
ML
⇔
Bi =
[
(αL − 1)I − Θ
ML
]
siL −
Z
ML
(58)
Since Bγi is monotonic in γ, the value of s
i
L that maximizes B
γ
i is the same with the
one that maximizes (58). Hence, by FOC:
∂Bi
∂siL
= (αL − 1)I − Θ
ML
(59)
We now examine two different cases depending on the sign of the first derivative.
Case 1: ∂Bi
∂siL
< 0
∂Bi
∂siL
< 0⇔ (αL − 1)I − Θ
ML
< 0⇔ (αL − 1)I − MLI(αH − 1)− (MH −ML)b
ML
< 0⇔
(αL − 1)I − (αH − 1)I +
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < 0⇔
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b < (αH − αL)I (60)
First, notice that condition (60) means that Pi must minimize s
i
L to maximize his
utility. Second, notice also that this condition does not depend on Mh or Ml, the
degree of ideological adherence to Pi, but on MH and ML, which reflect the total
ideological dispersion between groups and which are identical for Pj as well. In other
words, condition (60) is symmetric and either holds for both politicians or for none.
Therefore, if it is optimal for one of the two to minimize siL, it will also be optimal for
the other.
We proceed in our analysis assuming that condition (60) is satisfied and that Z < 0.
We will later return to show that the condition Z < 0 is indeed satisfied if (60) holds.
Using equation (57) we get:
βis
i
L = (αL − 1)siL −
Θ
MLI
siL −
Z
MLI
⇔ βi = (αL − 1)− Θ
MLI
− Z
MLIsiL
⇒ ∂βi
∂siL
< 0
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As Pi tries to minimize s
i
L, the amount of the low quality project’s return that will
be provided as a bribe will increase until it reaches its maximum value (βi = αL),
similarly to the symmetric case. At that point:
αL = (αL − 1)− Θ
MLI
− Z
MLIsiL
⇔ Z
MLIsiL
= −MLI +Θ
MLI
⇔ siL = −
Z
MLI +Θ
siL = −
E −MLλtjI −MLsjL(αH − 1− tj)I + (MH −ML)bsjL
MLI +MLI(αH − 1)− (MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = −
E −MLλtjI −MLsjL(αH − 1− tj)I + (MH −ML)bsjL
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
Because (57) holds for both politicians, it also holds that βj = αL. Using this fact
and the respective condition (44),(45),(46) for politician Pj, we get:
αLs
j
L + (λ− sjL)tj − sjL = 0⇔ tj =
sjL
(λ− sjL)
(61)
Substituting back to the previous expression:
siL = −
E −MLλ
(
sjL
λ−sjL
)
I −MLsjL(αH − 1− s
j
L
(λ−sjL)
)I + (MH −ML)bsjL
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = −
E −ML(λ− sjL) s
j
L
(λ−sjL)
I −MLsjL(αH − 1)I + (MH −ML)bsjL
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = −
E −MLsjLI −MLsjLαHI +MLsjLI + (MH −ML)bsjL
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = −
E − [MLαHI + (MH −ML)b]sjL
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = s
j
L −
E
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b ⇔
And by substituting the value of E:
siL = s
j
L −
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (62)
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Equation (62) gives the amount of low quality projects Pi needs to finance as a
response to his opponents strategy in order to win the election and maximize his payoff.
In a similar manner as in section 1, we denote this level of inefficiency as s˜iL. If the
politician were to draw, instead, condition (47) would be rewritten as:
Mh
MH
q+
Ml
ML
(1− q)+ s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
MH
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
MH
+
(siL − sjL)b
ML
=
1
2
(63)
The only difference now is that the politician does not require the  mass of extra
voters. Hence, by following the same steps as above we get a similar condition to (62),
which expresses the amount of low quality projects Pi needs to finance in order to
maximize his utility given that he draws the election:
siL = s
j
L −
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b (64)
The politician will prefer to draw the election rather than win with certainty if and
only if:
UP > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
Bγi > B˜γi ⇔ Bi > 2
1
γ B˜i ⇔ αLsiLI > 2
1
γαLs˜iLI ⇔
sjL −
1
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b > 2
1
γ
[
sjL −
1+
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b
]
⇔
2
1
γ
[
1+
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b
]
− 12MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b >
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
sjL ⇔
(
2
1
γ − 1
) [
1
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b
]
+ 2
1
γ
(
MHML
2
MLαHI−(MH−ML)b
)
>
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
sjL ⇔
sjL 6
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b +
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) ( MHML
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
)
(65)
The above condition determines a critical value for Pi in the same way as in the
symmetric political game. For values of sjL above this critical value, the politician
prefers to play aggressively and win the election with certainty, while for values below
the critical threshold he prefers to draw the election. Let this critical value be sjL
∗
.
Similarly, there is an equivalent critical value for Pj:
siL
∗
=
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b +
2
1−γ
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) ( MHML
MLαHI − (MH −ML)b
)
(66)
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Conditions (65) and (66) determine the equilibrium of the asymmetric game, as it
is described in section 2. Also, if condition (60) is satisfied, then:(
MH
ML
− 1
)
<
(αH − αL)I
b
⇔ (MH −ML)b < MLI(αH − αL)⇔
MLI(αH − αL)− (MH −ML)b > 0
But if this condition holds then also MLαHI − (MH −ML)b > 0 must also hold
since: MLI(αH −αL)− (MH −ML)b > 0⇔MLαHI− (MH −ML)b > MLIαL > 0 This
means that the solution we have provided above is well defined. Finally, we show that
if (60) is satisfied then also the assumption Z < 0 holds. To prove this, first observe
that the value of Z is equivalent to the left hand side of equation (54):
−MLλtiI −MLsiL(αH − 1− ti)I + (MH −ML)bsiL = Z
Also observe that, from conditions (44), (45), (46) we had previously derived that:
αLs
i
L − βisiL + (λ− siL)ti − siL = 0
Solving for ti and substituting in the previous relation gives:
ti =
(1 + βi − αL)siL
(λ− siL)
Z = −MLλtiI −MLsiL(αH − 1− ti)I + (MH −ML)bsiL ⇔
Z = −ML(λ− siL)ti −MLsiL(αH − 1)I + (MH −ML)bsiL ⇔
Z = −MLI(λ− siL)
(1 + βi − αL)siL
(λ− siL)
−MLI(αH − 1) + (MH −ML)bsiL ⇔
Z = −MLI(αH − αL) + (MH −ML)bsiL −MLIβisiL
But condition (60) implies that the sum of the first two terms is negative and the
third term is non-positive, so Z < 0. This concludes the exposition of case 1.
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Case 2: ∂Bi
∂siL
> 0
∂Bi
∂siL
> 0⇔
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I
The politician maximizes his utility when siL takes the highest possible value, in this
case. But, as siL increases, the tax rate must also increase in order to cover the losses
of state-owned banks. More formally, note that, the tax rate as a function of siL is by
equation (55):
ti =
Z +ΘsiL
−MLI(λ− siL)
By taking partial derivative of ti with respect to s
i
L, we get the following expression:
∂ti
∂siL
=
−MLIΘ(λ− siL)− (Z +ΘsiL)MLI
[−MLI(λ− siL)]2
⇔
∂ti
∂siL
=
−MLI(λΘ+ Z)
[−MLI(λ− siL)]2
Notice that the sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the expression λΘ+Z.
We use equations (54) and (56) to substitute for the values of Z and Θ, respectively:
λΘ+Z = λMLI(αH−1)−λ(MH−ML)b−λMLIti+(MH−ML)bsiL−siLMLI(αH−1−ti)⇔
λΘ+ Z = MLI(αH − 1− ti)(λ− siL)− (MH −ML)b(λ− siL)⇔
λΘ+ Z = (λ− siL) (MLI(αH − 1− ti)− (MH −ML)b)
Because we have assume that ∂Bi
∂siL
> 0 holds, then it also true that (MH −ML)b >
MLI(αH − αL) or MLI(αH − αL) − (MH −ML)b < 0. However, it is also true that:
(αH − αL) > (αH − 1− ti). Therefore:
MLI(αH − αL) > MLI(αH − 1− ti)⇔
MLI(αH − 1− ti)− (MH −ML)b < MLI(αH − αL)− (MH −ML)b < 0
Hence λΘ + Z < 0 and this implies that: ∂ti
∂siL
> 0. As siL increases, the required
taxation increases as well. Hence, the maximum value that siL can attain is when
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ti = αH − 1. The above conditions hold for both politicians and this means that
tj = αH − 1 as well. Under these conditions (53) and (54) transform into:
Z(tj, s
j
L) = Z = E −MLIλ(αH − 1) + (MH −ML)bsjL (67)
−MLIλ(αH − 1) + (MH −ML)bsiL = Z (68)
Hence:
siL =
Z +MLIλ(αH − 1)
(MH −ML)b ⇔ s
i
L =
E −MLIλ(αH − 1) + (MH −ML)bsjL +MLIλ(αH − 1)
(MH −ML)b ⇔
siL = s
j
L +
E
(MH −ML)b ⇔ s
i
L = s
j
L +
1+
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (69)
Because
(
MH
ML
− 1
)
b > (αH − αL)I ⇔ (MH −ML)b −MLI(αH − αL) > 0 it also
holds that (MH −ML)b > 0, so this solution is well defined. This is the value of siL
which Pi needs to offer to win the election and we denote it as s˜iL Also, By (44),(45)
and (46):
αLs
i
L − βisiL + (λ− siL)ti − siL = 0⇔ αLsiL − βisiL + (λ− siL)(αH − 1)− siL = 0⇔
βis
i
L = λ(αH − 1)− (αH − αL)siL ⇔ β˜i =
λ(αH − 1)
s˜iL
− (αH − αL) (70)
The overall utility to the politician by this strategy is given by:
B˜γi = (β˜is˜
i
LI)
γ =
[
λ(αH − 1)I − (αH − αL)s˜iLI
]γ
(71)
If the politician wants to draw the election, the respective conditions of (69), (70)
and (71) are:
siL = s
j
L +
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b (72)
βi =
λ(αH − 1)
siL
− (αH − αL) (73)
Bγi = (βis
i
LI)
γ ⇒ Bγi =
[
λ(αH − 1)I − (αH − αL)siLI
]γ
(74)
The politician will prefer draw over victory iff:
40
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
Bγi > B˜γi ⇔ Bi > 2
1
γ B˜i ⇔
λ(αH − 1)I − (αH − αL)siLI > 2
1
γ
[
λ(αH − 1)I − (αH − αL)s˜iLI
]
⇔
2
1
γ (αH − αL)s˜iL − (αH − αL)siL >
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
λ(αH − 1)⇔
2
1
γ
(
sjL +
1+
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
(MH−ML)b
)
− sjL −
1
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
(MH−ML)b
>
(
2
1
γ −1
)
λ(αH−1)
(αH−αL) ⇔
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
sjL +
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
1
2
MHML−MhMLq−MlMH(1−q)
(MH−ML)b + 2
1
γ

2
MHML
(MH−ML)b
>
(
2
1
γ −1
)
λ(αH−1)
(αH−αL) ⇔
sjL >
λ(αH − 1)
(αH − αL)−
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b −
2
1−γ
γ
2
1
γ − 1
[
MHML
(MH −ML)b
]
(75)
As in case 1, the above condition determines a critical value for Pi, below which
the politician prefers to play aggressively and win the election with certainty, while for
values above he prefers to draw. Once again, we denote the critical value as sjL
∗
. The
equivalent critical value for Pj is:
siL
∗
=
λ(αH − 1)
(αH − αL)−
1
2
MHML −MhMLq −MlMH(1− q)
(MH −ML)b −
2
1−γ
γ
2
1
γ − 1
[
MHML
(MH −ML)b
]
(76)
Conditions (75) and (76) determine the equilibrium of the asymmetric game under
case 2, as it is described in section 2.
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